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Abstract
This study aimed to shed light on the early phase of implementation of India’s landmark 
Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (RTE Act), effective as of 
April 2010, with special attention on the role of the private sector (i.e. private unaided 
schools). This working paper reports on the household- and school-level results of a 
larger project conducted in a Delhi slum. Data in this working paper were collected 
between June 2011 and April 2012 by a survey of 290 households in the selected slum 
area, semi-structured interviews with a sub-sample of 40 households, semi-structured 
interviews with principals from the seven most accessed schools in the survey sample, 
and documentary analysis of ofﬁ cial documents including draft versions of preceding 
RTE bills, the ﬁ nal Act, Central Government model rules, Delhi rules, and associated 
government orders and notices. We report results on the implementation and mediation 
processes in schools; experiences of households accessing schooling under the RTE 
Act, with a focus on their ability to access free school places under the 25 percent free 
seats provision; and household and school understandings of the Act and its provisions. 
Results indicate a considerable gap between the ofﬁ cial articulation of the Act’s provisions 
and its implementation in practice by schools in the study. Data also expose that fee-free 
“freeship” private education for households in the study, was not a reality in the early 
phase of the RTE Act’s implementation. While the focus of our study was on the private 
sector and the 25 percent free seats provision, our investigation showed that this was 
just one facet, albeit important, of the Act. In fact, the Act necessitates fundamental 
changes, procedural and conceptual, to education as a whole.
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1. Introduction
This study aims to shed light on the early phase of implementation of India’s landmark 
Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (RTE Act), effective as of 
April 2010, with special attention on the role of the private sector (i.e. private unaided 
schools). In the interest of space, this working paper is conﬁ ned to household- and school-
level results of a larger project in Delhi (Noronha and Srivastava 2012). We report results 
on the implementation and mediation processes in schools; experiences of households 
accessing schooling under the RTE Act; and household and school understandings of 
the Act and its provisions. While the focus of our study is on the private sector and the 25 
percent free seats provision, our investigation showed that this was just one facet, albeit 
important, of the Act. In fact, the Act necessitates fundamental changes, procedural and 
conceptual, to education as a whole.
1.1 Policy Context
While provisions acknowledging the right to education in principle existed long before 
the RTE Act, it is the ﬁ rst ofﬁ cial central government legislation to fully confer this right 
by law and to extend it across the country.1 This marks a signiﬁ cant shift, not only in the 
formal policy and legal frameworks governing education in India, but also in the way 
that it should be conceptualized in the Indian context. The RTE Act is the result of a long 
process of deliberation and public debate, causing much controversy. Commentators 
and activists highlight the lumbering process that led to its enactment, and point to a 
chain of successive bills beginning in 2004 and drafted in response to Article 21A in the 
86th Constitution Amendment Act 2002 which afﬁ rms the right of every child between 
the ages of six and fourteen to free and compulsory education (Jha and Parvati 2010; 
Madhavan and Mangnani 2005). There is a strong sentiment that widespread middle-
class ﬂ ight from the state education sector has fuelled a persistent lack of political will 
to introduce serious measures to attain the goal.
The mantras of insufﬁ cient demand from disadvantaged populations and scarce 
resources for education are recurring themes in the education and development 
literature and in the Indian context. The former may be conceptualized as an instance 
of assumptions of “false consciousness” (Maile 2004; Woolman and Fleisch 2006) or 
that “poverty creates a dependent class that is entirely dependent and cannot make 
decisions” about schooling (Woolman and Fleisch 2006: 53). Critics of dominant 
Indian education discourse contend that prevailing middle-class hegemony presents 
disadvantaged parents as favoring child labor over education (Balagopalan 2003; Kumar 
2008). 
Disadvantaged groups are characterized as uninterested in schooling, unaware of its 
beneﬁ ts, and unwilling to send their children to school rather than questioning the 
institutional structures that inhibit access to schooling for them (see Balagopalan 2003; 
Balagopalan and Subrahamanian 2003; Banerji 2000; Dyer 2010; Srivastava 2008a for 
1. With the exception of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, as stipulated in Section 1(1)(2) of the RTE Act. 
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critiques). In line with newer research in India and elsewhere (e.g. Akyeampong and 
Rolleston 2013; Fennell 2013; Härmä 2009; Srivastava 2007, 2008a; Woolman and 
Fleisch 2006), this study found that disadvantaged parents are motivated, and are often 
thoughtful and anxious in making schooling decisions, but face signiﬁ cant institutional 
barriers in access even with the implementation of the RTE Act.
The second set of arguments connected to scarce resources has also been contested in 
the literature. While the renewed commitment to increase public spending for education 
to 6 percent of GDP in the Eleventh Five Year Plan approach paper (Planning Commission 
2006: 57) was enthusiastically welcomed, there is little evidence to suggest that public 
expenditure has increased over the Plan period (2007–12) to meet this target. Tilak’s 
(2010) analysis of the Eleventh Five Year Plan allocations ﬁ nds a disturbing trend. Central 
government allocations to education increased only modestly from 0.58 percent of GDP 
in 2006–07 to 0.71 percent of GDP in 2010–11, the last year of the Plan’s allocation. State 
governments, which typically spend more due to the ﬁ nancing structure of education in 
India, did not fare much better. Allocations increased slightly from 2.2 percent of GDP in 
2006–07 to 2.6 percent in 2009–10 (Tilak 2010).2 
The argument of scarce resources to explain this low allocation is difﬁ cult to justify, as 
both the Tenth and Eleventh Five Year Plan periods saw substantive macroeconomic 
growth rates of between 8 and 10 percent annually (Planning Commission 2005, 2006). 
As the Twelfth Five Year Plan (2012–17) was not released at the time of writing, it remains 
to be seen whether budgetary commitments and allocations will increase substantially 
in the future.
Given the aims of the RTE Act, it has been suggested that the 6 percent GDP target 
would be insufﬁ cient even if met, leading some to call for the need to increasingly 
involve the private sector (Jain and Dholakia 2009, 2010). The increased role of private 
and non-state actors (including NGOs) in education in India has received attention for 
some time. It has been met with signiﬁ cant discontent by critics, especially with regards 
to the Act’s aims, which question the quality of private schooling alternatives available 
to disadvantaged groups and the persistent underfunding of education by the state, and 
raise the responsibility of the state to fulﬁ l its obligation as a major concern (Jha and 
Parvati 2010; Ramachandran 2009; Sarangapani 2009; Tilak 2007). 
Srivastava’s (2010) analysis of the Tenth and Eleventh Five-Year Plans conﬁ rms the 
increased role of private and non-state actors through an undeﬁ ned mechanism of 
public-private partnerships, referred to simply as the “PPP mode” in policy documents, 
and a weakened role for the state in education ﬁ nance, management and regulation. 
This is coupled with a general malaise seen in successive proposals to increase the role 
of NGOs and school-based committees to monitor school performance, rather than a 
twinned strategy of strengthening state inspectorates, in an already highly decentralized 
system without appropriate checks and balances (Kumar 2008; Tilak 2007). The 
underlying view is that “governments ﬁ nd it convenient to use decentralization [and 
privatization] as a mechanism of abdication of its own responsibilities of educating the 
people” (Tilak 2007: 3874).
2. Estimates for state government allocations to education for 2010–11 were not available in Tilak’s analysis.
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Fuelling the debate is Section 12(1)(c) of the RTE Act, compelling all private schools to 
allocate 25 percent of their places in Class 1 (or pre-primary as applicable) for free to 
“children belonging to weaker section[s] and disadvantaged group[s]” to be retained until 
they complete elementary education (Class 8).3 Private schools are to be reimbursed for 
each child enrolled under the quota at the level of state expenditure per child or tuition 
fee charged at the school, whichever is less (Government of India 2009: Section 12(2)). 
In Delhi, this amounted to a maximum of Rs.1,190/child/month for the 2011–12 school 
year (Government of NCT of Delhi 2012).
Proponents claim that the free seats provision is an equity measure aimed at opening 
up a highly stratiﬁ ed school system to disadvantaged children, and also that it is the 
only way to achieve universal elementary education because of insufﬁ cient state sector 
capacity (Jain and Dholakia 2010). Critics maintain that the provision marks the most 
explicit institutional legitimization of the private sector in education without sufﬁ cient 
effort to strengthen the decaying state sector (Jha and Parvati 2010; Ramachandran 
2009).
Complicating the implementation of the RTE Act are powerful private school lobbies 
that launched a Supreme Court case arguing that the provision impinged on their right 
to run their schools without undue government interference, and that the Act was 
unconstitutional (India Today 2012). At the time of writing, a Supreme Court verdict 
upholding the Act and its provisions had been passed after a long and contentious 
hearing. It is within this broader context that the RTE Act was born and is being 
implemented.
 
1.2 Research Objectives and Questions 
The full study included an in-depth analysis of the RTE Act, its rules and provisions, 
how the Act directed local policy action, and how it was implemented and understood 
by government ofﬁ cials and local implementers in Delhi; household experiences of 
accessing schooling under the Act and their understandings of it; and the way it was 
understood and mediated/ implemented by local schools. A particular focus was how 
households accessed private schools and their attempts at securing places under the 
25 percent free seats provision through a “freeship” as the places in the quota are known, 
and private school responses in this regard. 
One urban slum in Delhi was selected as the ﬁ eld site. Delhi was chosen as the location 
as it is the political center of the country, one of the ﬁ rst sites to implement the Act, and 
had a preceding Supreme Court order in 2004 directing private schools allotted land at 
concessionary rates by the government to institute a similar quota. Thus, it was assumed 
that one could reasonably expect to ﬁ nd a mix of schools instituting and households 
3. A child belonging to a “weaker section” is a child with a parent or guardian whose annual income is lower than the 
minimum limit speciﬁ ed by the appropriate government (Section 2(e), RTE Act). This is ofﬁ cially interpreted as 
children coming from “economically weaker sections” (EWSs), deﬁ ned by the Ministry of Finance as incomes of less 
than Rs.100,000 (Indian Rupees, US$1,607) per year. According to the Act, a child belonging to a “Disadvantaged 
group” is a child belonging to a scheduled caste, scheduled tribe, socially and educationally backward class or a 
group disadvantaged by social, cultural, economic, geographic or linguistic factors or by gender (Section 2(d), RTE 
Act).
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availing themselves of the provision even in the early phase of implementation. The 
research questions framing the study were: 
 • What are the key provisions of the RTE Act? How are they understood by ofﬁ cials, 
schools, and disadvantaged households? 
 • How has the RTE Act directed policy action in the local area? How have local 
schools reacted to, implemented or mediated policy changes?
 • What is the experience of households accessing schooling under the RTE Act? 
How does the experience of households accessing private schools through 
“freeships” (25 percent quota) compare with households accessing government 
schools or private schools otherwise?
Following a selected review of the literature and outlining the conceptual framework 
for the study (Section 2), we present an overview of the research design and methods 
used at the household and school levels (Section 3). Section 4 presents school and 
household proﬁ les and schooling patterns, and Sections 5 and 6, the main ﬁ ndings 
regarding household experiences and school responses, respectively. We conclude with 
a discussion of the implications of the results (Section 7). 
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2. A Selected Review of the Literature
The following review, though not exhaustive, teases out some aspects of the more 
recent work on private schooling in India that are of relevance to our study and inform 
the context within which private schools are situated. In sum, results regarding private 
school achievement and quality are mixed, and serious concerns about the ability of 
disadvantaged groups to participate in the sector have been raised. The gap between 
the ofﬁ cial articulation of the regulatory framework in principle and how it is mediated 
by private schools and institutional actors in practice is of immediate concern regarding 
the implementation of the RTE Act. We also brieﬂ y describe the conceptual framework 
guiding our analysis.
2.1 Summary of Literature on Private Schooling in India
There has undoubtedly been substantial growth in private provision in India over the 
last two decades. Kingdon’s (2007) analysis of four National Council of Educational 
Research and Training (NCERT) survey ﬁ gures estimates that between 1993 and 2002 
nearly 96 percent of the total increase in primary enrollment in urban areas was due to 
the growth of private schooling.4 Pratham’s Annual Status of Education Reports (ASER) 
since 2005 also show increasing trends of private enrollment in rural areas, though there 
is variability on the extent of private enrollment between states (e.g. Pratham 2010). 
Muralidharan and Kremer (2007), based on a representative sample from 20 states, 
found 28 percent of the population of rural India to have access to private schools in the 
same village.
A good number of studies on private schooling in India (e.g. De et al. 2002; Härmä 
2009; Ohara 2013; Srivastava 2007; Tooley and Dixon 2006; Tooley et al. 2010) focus 
on the type of private provision that has emerged in the context of a well-documented 
malfunctioning government system (e.g. PROBE Team 1999). These studies, many 
on low-fee private schooling, focus on issues such as affordability, access, school 
management and operation structures, parental perceptions and decision making, and 
policy implications.
The most contentious of this work is research by James Tooley and his colleagues on 
“private schools for the poor” or “budget private schools.” The work that has received 
much attention was based on a school census conducted by the researchers in “notiﬁ ed 
slums” in Andhra Pradesh. Results showed that while 59.8 percent of schools in the 
selected areas of Hyderabad slums were private unaided, the proportion in rural/peri-
urban Mahbubnagar was smaller, at 35.4 percent, capturing 64.6 percent and 48.8 
percent of student enrollments respectively. On a range of input indicators (classrooms, 
toilets, drinking water, etc.) and some observation of “teaching activity,” these schools 
seemed to perform better. 
4. Kingdon estimates this to be an under-representation, as unrecognized schools are not captured in ofﬁ cial NCERT 
survey ﬁ gures.
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However, on deeper outcomes indicators, the results are less clear. They show that “in 
Hyderabad, boys, if they are in school, are more likely to go to private unaided school” 
(Tooley and Dixon 2006: 451) than government schools, and private unaided schools 
in Mahbubnagar had slightly more boys than girls, representative of the schooling 
situation more generally, indicating potential gender bias. While the researchers found 
a private school advantage in mathematics and English (to be expected, as many private 
schools were purportedly English-medium), this achievement gap narrowed when 
background variables were controlled for (social status, peer group, parents’ education, 
etc.), and disappeared in the case of Urdu language (Tooley et al. 2010). Thus, given the 
varied results, particularly in arguably the more important set of outcome indicators, 
critics (e.g. Nambissan and Ball 2010; Sarangapani and Winch 2010) wonder why these 
researchers uniformly maintain the argument that “private schools for the poor” are 
more efﬁ cient and of better quality than state schools, and the best way to meet the 
needs of the disadvantaged.
Pratham’s (2010) extensive national rural 2009 ASER survey covering 30 villages in every 
district in the country showed that once characteristics other than the type of school 
were controlled for (e.g. mother’s education, father’s education, private tuition, etc.), the 
learning differential between government and private school students fell dramatically 
(p. 7). There was even a negative relationship between private school attendance and 
local language achievement in some states (i.e. Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and 
Tamil Nadu).
Muralidharan and Kremer’s (2007) results from a nationally representative survey of 
rural private primary schools found the mean teachers’ salary at private schools to 
be less than at government schools, typically one-ﬁ fth the amount. Unlike Tooley and 
colleagues, the researchers found that there was no signiﬁ cant difference in private and 
public school infrastructure, and “the results with state and with village ﬁ xed effects 
suggest that conditional on being in the same village, private schools have poorer 
facilities and infrastructure than the public schools” (Muralidharan and Kremer 2007,: 
11). Controlling for family and other characteristics reduced the private school advantage 
that Class 4 students had on a standardized math and language test (weighted in 
favour of math), but remained “strongly signiﬁ cant and of considerable magnitude (0.4 
standard deviations on the test)” (Muralidaharan and Kremer 2007: 15).
A number of other studies present a complex picture of private schooling embedded 
along caste, religious, gender, and poverty lines, which focuses on equity issues (De et 
al. 2002; Härmä 2009; Hill et al. 2011; Siddhu 2010; Srivastava 2008a), and that are of 
signiﬁ cance to this study. De et al.’s (2002) household and school survey of one district 
each in Haryana, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh found that low-fee private schools were 
accessed in both rural and urban areas. These schools had mushroomed due to the 
poor employment opportunities available to the educated and the drop in government 
school quality. But given low school income levels, teaching staff was poorly qualiﬁ ed, 
poorly paid, and had a high turnover. Asset ownership data conﬁ rmed that private 
school children came from somewhat better-off families, and this choice was relatively 
more favorable for boys. The most disadvantaged accessed government schools which 
were of comparatively lower quality on basic indicators of facilities and teaching activity. 
The authors concluded that improving the quality of government primary schools was 
critical to improving schooling for the most disadvantaged, and that of the low-fee 
private sector.
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In her study of recognized and unrecognized private unaided primary schools in 10 
villages in Uttar Pradesh, Härmä (2009) found that none of the teachers were trained, 
only 34 percent had secondary schooling, and they received salaries only up to one-tenth 
of those in government schools. When examining enrolments according to caste and 
religion, it became clear that while disadvantaged groups preferred private schooling 
similar to higher-caste groups, they were less able to access it for their children due to 
unaffordability. There was a “pro-male bias” in the sample with only 34 percent of girls 
compared to 51 percent of boys attending low-fee private schools. She thus questioned 
the “affordability” of low-fee private schooling, concluding that “… it is the traditionally 
disadvantaged in society who are being left behind in the ongoing LFP [low-fee private] 
schooling revolution” (p. 160). 
Srivastava’s in-depth qualitative work on low-fee private schooling in Lucknow District, 
Uttar Pradesh showed disadvantaged parents conceptualizing the education sector as 
socially segmented, i.e. one where every social group has its place, covering a spectrum 
where the most advantaged attend elite high-fee schools and the most disadvantaged 
are relegated to the government sector (Srivastava 2007, 2008a). Many felt they had no 
choice but to access the low-fee sector, but would have been happy to access the state 
sector and ease the cost burden if it performed better. Motivations to access low-fee 
private schooling were complex, such as presumed better quality, prestige, and peer 
pressure. Using Hirschman’s (1970) theory of exit, voice and loyalty, the exit of the 
mobilized poor did not seem to perform a quality recuperating function on the state 
sector (Srivastava 2007; see also Fennell 2010 for similar results in Pakistan).
Perhaps the most disconcerting results were that low-fee private schools engaged in a set 
of corrupt practices and perverse incentives for daily school operations in contravention 
of ofﬁ cial rules and quality norms (Srivastava 2008b; see also De et al. 2002; Ohara 
2013; Tooley and Dixon 2005 for similar results in Delhi and Hyderabad, respectively). 
This “shadow institutional framework” (Srivastava 2008b) of practices included 
double enrollment of unrecognized school students in other recognized schools for a 
fee; private tuition centers functioning as secondary schools as they required less red 
tape to establish; and using political inﬂ uence or bribery to gain recognition. Results 
raised serious questions about the quality baseline provided even at recognized low-fee 
private schools, and also about the process through which ofﬁ cial education policy is 
implemented and mediated.
Ohara’s (2013) study in Delhi shows evidence that some low-fee private operators have 
built-in mechanisms that allow them to mediate policy through the shadow rules more 
easily, and with fewer transaction costs. Given the RTE Act’s directive compelling all 
private schools to obtain recognition within three years or face closure (Government of 
India 2009: Sections 18–19), Ohara warns of the possibility that the number of “falsely 
recognized” schools will further increase.
2.2 Concepts for Analysis
While the potential role of private schooling and the 25 percent free seats provision may 
be the most obviously contentious clause of the Act, we posit that the vigorous debate 
on this clause, and the Act more generally, is because at its heart rest fundamental 
concepts about education, social exclusion and processes of policy enactment and 
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implementation. These raise questions about how/whether the RTE Act, as any legal 
instrument, can address equity concerns. These concepts form the framework for the 
project, and in our minds, the larger issues that frame the Act’s implementation. In the 
interest of space, only a brief review of concepts that oriented the analysis is presented 
here.
The conceptual framework was built on new institutional (North 1990) and latent 
Bourdieuian theoretical constructs, and rested on three sets of concepts. The ﬁ rst viewed 
the design and implementation of education policy and access to education as played out 
in a game of competing interests, bargaining power and (muted) contestation, in which 
education was seen as a site of “symbolic domination” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). 
Often, contestation is quelled through the presentation of technicist policy “solutions” 
that are galvanized to legitimate collective action. 
In the second, social exclusion was seen as the result of formal rules and informal norms 
and practices inhibiting access to fundamental resources and rights (Kabeer 2000). Thus, 
rather than viewing education exclusion as “a pathology of the poor or disenfranchized” 
(Macrae et al. 2003) where the excluded are seen to be the perpetrators of their exclusion, 
we questioned the social processes and institutions that lead to exclusion. 
Finally, we assumed that the role of “unruly practices” or “the gap between rules and 
their implementation” (Kabeer 2000: 92) in mediating policy action by schools and 
institutional actors was key. We also built on the notion of the “shadow institutional 
framework” (Srivastava 2008b), a complex set of codiﬁ ed informal norms and practices 
assuming rule-like status, used to mediate formal macro-level education policy.
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3.  Design and Methods 
Fieldwork was conducted between June 2011 and January 2012, with the bulk of the 
household- and school-level data collected between June and September 2011, and 
documentary analysis completed in April 2012. Data for the full study were collected 
through: a household survey of 290 households in one resettlement block and adjacent 
squatter colony in the selected slum; semi-structured interviews with 40 households 
drawn from this larger sample; semi-structured interviews with the seven most accessed 
local government and private schools; semi-structured interviews with 11 policy ofﬁ cials 
and implementers; and documentary analysis of the RTE Act and rules at the level of the 
Central and Delhi governments, relevant preceding bills and associated documents, and 
government notices and circulars. Here we present only the methods and design for the 
household and school levels (see Noronha and Srivastava 2012 for full study).
3.1 The Study Site
Considerations for site selection included: a recognized slum area; access to both 
government and smaller local private schools; and our own familiarity with NGOs in 
the area that could facilitate access to local residents. With the help of key informants, 
Karampur was selected, as it met these criteria.5 It had an added advantage of being 
relatively more mobilized than comparable locations, as local NGOs had worked on 
disseminating the RTE Act and assisted parents with freeship admission. Thus, we 
assumed that there was greater likelihood of capturing freeship households in the early 
phases of implementation. 
Karampur’s history is tied to the overall migration patterns of Delhi. From the earliest 
days in 1961, much of the migration has been distress migration, primarily from Bihar, 
Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh. Squatter colonies grew on vacant land near drains and 
bridges, etc. in central Delhi. From time to time, inhabitants were relocated to areas on 
the periphery. These relocated slum clusters were known as “resettlement colonies.” 
During the years 1975–77, one of the largest ever relocations was carried out, resulting 
in around 26 new resettlement colonies (Government of NCT of Delhi 2002). Karampur 
was one of them. 
Thirty-ﬁ ve years later, Karampur comprises a number of blocks and is well-developed, 
with pakka houses and several public facilities. One block in Karampur was chosen for 
the sample site because it was adjacent to a squatter (jhuggi) colony, visibly poorer and 
much more congested. The squatter colony also formed part of the study site to capture 
a wider spectrum of households. 
Blocks had long rows of back-to-back housing, mostly of two storeys, occupying 25 
square yard plots, with 4-foot wide brick-paved lanes. In contrast, the squatter colony 
squeezed a much larger number of households onto 3 to 9 square yard plots. The semi-
pakka or makeshift shacks often had only plastic sheets and odd wooden pieces for 
5. Karampur is a pseudonym. All names appearing in interview quotes are also pseudonyms.
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rooﬁ ng. The narrow, winding pathways had open drains and piles of slushy garbage. 
Resettlement colony housing generally had piped water and toilets, while the squatter 
colony had public taps and a public toilet complex.
3.2 Household- and School-level Research Methods
All data collection instruments were designed by the main researchers (Srivastava 
and Noronha). Household-, school- and policy-level ﬁ eld data were collected by the 
main researchers with the aid of a research team. A preliminary household survey 
was conducted by a team trained in survey data collection. The team was also trained 
in appropriate qualitative research methods, data collection, and documentation 
procedures over multiple days prior to data collection activities, with debrieﬁ ng sessions 
throughout the ﬁ eldwork. 
3.2.1 Household Survey
We conducted a preliminary household survey to obtain a picture of socioeconomic and 
education proﬁ les of the study site, and to later generate a household sub-sample with 
appropriate variation for semi-structured interviews. The survey was simultaneously 
conducted in the selected resettlement colony block (RC) and adjacent squatter jhuggi 
colony (JJC) to capture a spectrum of disadvantaged households. Every household was 
surveyed, but as we were interested in school participation, only those with young people 
between 6 and 16 years of age were selected. The questionnaire contained questions on 
socioeconomic status, including adults’ and children’s occupations, education proﬁ les 
and basic household assets. The survey also documented the names of all schools 
attended by participants, and school fees for anyone between 0 and 18 years in the 
household.
The JJC survey was discontinued after a few days as private school patronage was found 
to be negligible. The entire resettlement block was surveyed as the ﬁ eldwork showed 
ample patronage of private schools there. As our initial analysis showed only four 
households in the RC block and JJC accessing private schools through the freeship, an 
additional six households in an adjacent block were surveyed by snowballing (see Table 
1). Data collected from the household survey were analysed using descriptive statistics, 
and in tabular and graphic form.
Table 1. — Total household survey sample
No. of Households Population
JJC 62 350
RC Block 1* 222 1,301
RC Block 2** 6 27
Total 290 1,678
Notes: * All analysis was done by grouping RC Blocks 1 and 2 together. 
  ** Block 2 was adjacent to Block 1.
Source: Household survey ﬁ eld data
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3.2.2  Semi-structured Household Interviews
A sub-sample of 40 households from the larger survey sample was drawn for detailed 
semi-structured interviews. Households were selected on the basis of maximum 
variation of school choice, to enable understanding on a range of perspectives on 
private participation and schooling experiences. The semi-structured interview sample 
consisted of four household groups (Table 2). 
Table 2. — Semi-structured household interview sample
Category Number of households
Category 1: Government schools only 11
Category 2: One or more child in local Fee Level 1 private schools* 11
Category 3: One or more child in Fee Level 2 private schools* 8
Category 4: Accessing private school(s) through freeship 10
Total 40
Note: * Fee Level 1 schools charged Rs.3,600–6,000 (US$58–96) per year at primary/upper primary level; Fee Level 
2 schools charged Rs.10,000 (US$161) or more per year at primary/upper primary level
We did not ﬁ nd any household accessing Fee Level 1 schools through the freeship among 
the 290 households surveyed. All freeship households accessed Fee Level 2 schools, 
usually in the upper fee band within this sub-set of schools.
The semi-structured interview schedule consisted of six parts for all households, and 
a seventh, for freeship households. Questions were on: decision-making and school 
choice processes; perceptions of school quality; schooling costs and fee concessions; 
parental and children’s experiences of interacting with schools; issues of voice and 
school responsiveness; understanding of the RTE Act’s provisions (including attempts 
at securing freeships); and, for freeship households, experiences of securing the freeship 
and of inclusion within the school. The interview schedule was piloted in a similar 
community, and adjustments were made.
Interviews were conducted at interviewees’ homes by two members of the research team 
in Hindi, lasting approximately 45–60 minutes each. The majority of respondents were 
mothers, though in several cases both parents responded, and in some cases, elder 
siblings supplemented parents’ responses. Interviews were taped and documented in 
detail. Data were analysed and coded in ATLAS.ti. 
3.2.3  Semi-structured School Interviews
The school sample for semi-structured interviews consisted of seven schools drawn from 
the most frequently accessed government and private schools by survey households. Of 
these, four were the most frequently accessed Fee Level 1 schools in the survey (three 
local, and one around 1.5 kilometers away), claiming 89 percent of children attending 
Fee Level 1 schools in survey households. One was a Fee Level 2 school that offered 
freeships to 6 of the 12 freeship students in our sample (also the only Fee Level 2 school 
to consent to the research). Two were government primary schools, one of which was a 
girls’ school (in the morning shift) and the other a boys’ school (in the afternoon shift). 
Unfortunately, ofﬁ cial permission to visit the integrated government secondary schools 
(i.e. all-through schools offering Classes 1 to 12), which were the most popular in the 
community overall, was denied. 
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The interview questions consisted of ﬁ ve sections for all schools and a sixth for private 
schools only. Questions were on: school background (establishment, management, 
general policies, etc.); household—school interaction; inclusion practices; perceptions, 
knowledge and understanding of the RTE Act and its provisions; experience of instituting 
the free seats provision (private schools only); and school data (e.g. enrollment, 
numbers of teachers, numbers of classrooms, freeship students, caste breakdown, etc.). 
Observations on infrastructure and teaching activities supplemented semi-structured 
interviews. 
In most cases, visits were unannounced. Interviews lasted approximately 45–60 minutes 
and were conducted on school premises in Hindi by two members of the research team, 
one of whom was a main researcher. Interviews were recorded and transcribed, and 
coded in ATLAS ti. The foci for analysis were policy interpretation and implementation 
by schools, and school perceptions of their role in the community.
The private schools were reluctant to provide data on fee structure and salaries. Despite 
repeated visits and requests, these could be collected in full for only two Fee Level 1 
schools, and partially for the Fee Level 2 school. The latter provided data without 
specifying fee structure and salaries as required. Both government schools complied. 
As intimated above, our household survey revealed two categories of local private 
schools accessed—one with an annual fee range of Rs.3,600–6,000 at primary (Classes 
1–5) level (named Fee Level 1), and the second encompassing a larger variety of schools 
with a fee range higher than Rs.10,000 per year (named Fee Level 2). While Fee Level 
1 schools were relatively less expensive than Fee Level 2 schools, in the absence of an 
ofﬁ cial deﬁ nition of “low-fee private” schools, they did not fall within Srivastava’s (2008b) 
operationalization of low-fee private schools as private unaided schools charging a 
monthly fee equivalent to a maximum of one day’s labour at the primary levels and two 
days’ labour at the secondary levels. Also, while Fee Level 2 schools charged relatively 
higher fees, most of them would not be considered high-fee, elite schools.
3.2.4 Document Analysis
Ofﬁ cial documents pertaining to the RTE Act, including draft versions of preceding bills, 
the ﬁ nal Act, central government model rules, Delhi rules, and associated government 
orders and notices, were analyzed involving critical discourse analysis (Fairclough 
2003). Questions guiding document analysis focused on tracing changes in successive 
articulations to key provisions in order to determine the formal policy framework in 
principle, with special attention to locating private schools within the Act and preceding 
bills. 
At the school level, this was used as a basis from which to interrogate emerging insights 
from semi-structured school interviews on the Act’s implementation in practice; at the 
household-level, their actual experiences of accessing schooling; and at all levels to 
compare participants’ understanding of the RTE Act with ofﬁ cial perceptions. 
Some of the relevant ofﬁ cial rules and government orders/notices (e.g. the Delhi RTE 
Rules and free seats provision reimbursement procedures) did not exist at the time 
of ﬁ eldwork. These were analyzed as and when they were issued. Thus, school-level 
analysis was not done retroactively but rather in accordance with information that was 
known to schools at the time. 
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4. Contextualizing Households and Schools
This section presents proﬁ les of the seven schools in our study and survey households. 
We also present the schooling patterns of these households and schooling costs incurred 
by the sub-group of interview households.
4.1  School Proﬁ les
Table 3 presents a summary of general school characteristics of the seven schools in our 
study. Fee Level 1 private schools (Schools 1–4) charged annual fees in the range of Rs.3, 
600–Rs.6,600 (US$58–106), and absorbed 89 percent of children attending Fee Level 
1 schools in our household survey. School 5 was a Fee Level 2 school, and was an elite 
school, attended by 6 of the total 12 (50 percent) children attending schools through the 
freeship. It did not charge tuition fees to these students, though other fees were charged 
(see Section 4.4). Schools 6 and 7 were a girls’ and a boys’ local government primary 
school, respectively, run by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD).
Table 3. — Proﬁ le of schools in study
School 
ID no.
Management 
type
Year
established
Year
recognized
Level Tuition fees 
(Rest./year)
Enrolment
Boys Girls
1 Private unaided 1995 2004 Primary 4,800–6,000 Unavailable Unavailable
2 Private unaided 2000 2004 Primary 3,600–6,000 238 163
3 Private unaided 1998 2001 Primary 4,200–6,600 134 65
4 Private unaided 1984 1992 Primary 
and junior
3,600–6,600 320 197
5 Private unaided 1988 1991 All-through 
secondary
24,000
(nil for freeship 
students)
1,496 1,132
6 Local gov. 1978 1978 Primary Nil — 643
7 Local gov. 1976 1976 Primary Nil 264 —
Source: School Survey ﬁ eld data.
The community has long had exposure to government schooling. The two primary schools 
were set up in the 1970s along with the colony, and were situated within it. Schools 1–3, 
private primary schools, were around half a kilometer away, and were all relatively new. 
School 4 was about 1 kilometer away, in a slightly better-off area. School 5, the freeship 
school, was an all-through school in an upscale middle-class neighborhood around 3 
kilometers away. Among the private schools, these latter two schools were older.
Infrastructure-wise, all except the elite school had modest facilities. Classrooms were 
pakka and had desks and benches or chairs. The two MCD government primary schools 
shared the same facility but were run at different times, and had different teachers and 
management staff. Unlike the buildings of the Fee Level 1 private schools, which were 
situated on much more compact premises, the government school premises were 
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sprawling and had a playground. Conversely, well-guarded premises were a feature of 
all ﬁ ve private schools, whereas government school gates were not guarded. This had 
an important bearing on experienced school quality, as household data will show. All 
schools had separate toilets for girls and boys, lights, fans and drinking water.
The Fee Level 2 freeship school had extravagant infrastructure with a number of two- and 
three-storey buildings, accessed through guarded gates, a big garden, swimming pool, 
games facilities and spacious classrooms. It also had a large array of activity rooms and 
facilities for art, music, dance, theater, computers, libraries and well-equipped science 
laboratories. 
4.2 Household Proﬁ les
Table 4 presents the household survey sample by asset ranking. The majority of 
households in the resettlement block and squatter colony fell in the “very poor” and 
“poor” ranks combined. However, 62.9 percent of squatter colony households fell in the 
very poor rank against just 12.7 percent in the resettlement block, and none of the former 
were in the relatively higher ranks of “average” or “better.” There was some variation 
among resettlement block households, with 37.7 percent in the average and 1.3 percent 
in the better ranks.
Table 4. — Household asset ranking (percentage)
RC households (%) JJC households (%)
Very poor 12.7 62.9
Poor 48.3 37.1
Average 37.7 0
Better 1.3 0
Total no. of households 228 62
Source: Household survey ﬁ eld data 
Occupationally, 55.6 percent of the squatter colony and 60.7 percent of the resettlement 
block working adults reported themselves as having permanent jobs in the private or 
government sectors, though 100 percent of those with prized government jobs were in 
the resettlement block. The great majority (91.5 percent) of self-employed adults (e.g. 
skilled workers, such as tailors, or small enterprise owners) were in the resettlement 
block, in contrast with a higher proportion (57.6 percent) of daily wage earners, the 
poorest paid and most erratic form of labor, in the squatter colony. 
4.3 Household Schooling Patterns
Households accessed a variety of government and private schools. In all, the 290 
survey households accessed some 44 schools. The majority of children attended Delhi 
Department of Education government secondary schools, almost all of which were 
integrated schools for primary and secondary levels. A sizeable number were also in the 
local MCD government primary schools.
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Table 5. — School participation and reported fees
School type Fee reported by households Number of 
attending 
children
% of attending 
children
Mean Median
Central School 
(Classes 0–12)
3,699 3,340 8 1.3
Government Senior Secondary
(Classes 1–12; 6–10; 6–12)
259 240 358 56.6
MCD Primary
(Classes 1–5)
104 150 87 13.7
Fee Level 1 Private
(Classes 0–5; Classes 0–8)
4,449 4,320 127 20.1
Fee Level 2 Private 
(Classes 0–8; 0–12)
17,127 13,200 38 6.0
* Fee Level 2 Private EWS 
Freeship
0 0 12 1.9
Private Aided School 2,340 2,100 3 0.5
Source: Household survey ﬁ eld data
Notes: Most private schools begin with one to two years of pre-school classes. This was sometimes found in 
government schools. Government primary schools are supposed to be fee-free.
  * Freeship households reported no tuition fees. This is not the same as annual expenditure. See also Figure 2 
and Table 7.
The most frequently accessed private schools were Fee Level 1 schools, and were usually 
within 0.5 kilometers of the study area. Fee Level 2 private schools were situated outside 
the study site in more middle-class areas. The more frequently accessed of these schools 
had fee levels around Rs.10,000 (US$161) peryear at the primary levels and often 
demanded a donation for admission (capitation fee).
The more expensive of these schools belonged to the elite set of private schools. The 
few children in our sample that attended them had, with rare exceptions, been admitted 
into these prized “all-through” (Classes 1–12) elite schools under the freeship and did 
not pay tuition fees. Fees could range from Rs.20,000 to Rs.30,000 (US$321–482) per 
year at a conservative estimate, and though highly desirable to parents, were largely 
unaffordable to our survey sample. The 25 percent free seats provision opened up some 
access to the elite schooling sector, albeit to a small minority of students. However, our 
household interview data will show freeship access was not straightforward, favoring 
relatively more advantaged households, and signiﬁ cant schooling costs for freeship 
students were incurred. 
Table 6 presents the schooling patterns of survey households by asset ranking. Data 
suggest that despite the free seats provision, the ability of these households to access 
private schools was severely constrained for “very poor” households, and less so for 
households in the highest rank under consideration (i.e. “average”). In total, 61 percent 
of average households chose private schools for at least some of their children, and 
40 percent chose them exclusively, compared with respective ﬁ gures for very poor 
households at just 17 percent and 10 percent.
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Table 6. — Schooling patterns by asset ranking
Very Poor Poor Average Better*
% Tot 
Sample
% Within 
Rank
% Tot 
Sample
% Within 
Rank
% Tot 
Sample
% Within 
Rank
% Tot 
Sample
% Within 
Rank
Government 19 82 27 59 12 40 1 67
Private 2 10 10 22 12 40 0 0
Mixed (Government 
+Private)
2 7 9 19 6 21 0 33
Total 23 99 46 100 30 101 1 99
Source: Household survey ﬁ eld data.
Notes: Discrepancies in percentage totals are due to rounding.
  * Owing to the negligible number of households in the “better” category, the results are not considered here.
Figure 1 shows private and government school access by class (grade) level for children 
survey households. The proportion of children attending private schools is highest 
in pre-primary, with a relatively stable decrease over the primary cycle (Classes 1–5) 
thereafter. Overall, we see that as class levels increase, so does access in government 
schools. Private school access is low through upper-primary/junior school (Classes 6–8) 
and negligible at secondary school level. Household interview data further indicate that 
the rise in school fees as class levels increase is a major reason for this shift. 
Figure 1. — Government and private school access by class level (%)
Source: Household survey ﬁ eld data.
4.4 Schooling Costs
Figure 2 shows per-child annual expenditure on elementary education for the sub-
sample of 40 interview households. There is a large discrepancy between government 
and private schooling household expenditure, including for supposedly “fee-free” 
freeship students. The annual cost per child in private Fee Level 1 schools was over 
6 times that in government schools, over 18 times in Fee Level 2 schools, and over 8 
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times for freeship students. Thus, it appears that despite the Act’s provisions, schooling 
for freeship students is not fee-free, and households are paying well above the cost to 
access a Fee Level 1 private school on a fee-paying basis, with the government option 
still the cheapest.
 
Figure 2. — Per-child annual average household elementary education expenditure (Rs.) 
(n=39)
Source: Semi-structured interview ﬁ eld data.
Table 7 expresses the same costs as a proportion of the daily wage rate for unskilled 
labor in Delhi at the time (Rs.6,422, US$103 per month) and the maximum eligibility 
criterion for the freeship (Rs.100,000, US$1,607 per year). It is obvious that if the choice 
was between the private and government schools in our study, affordability for both of 
these groups of anything other than government schools would be highly unlikely, as the 
costs presented are for just one child.
Table 7. — Annual elementary education expenditure per child as a proportion of set income 
levels
% unskilled labour daily wage 
rate (Delhi, 2011)
% EWS maximum income 
criterion (Rs.100,000)
Government 1.9 1.5
Private Fee Level 1 12.5 9.7
Private Fee Level 2 36.5 28
Freeship 17.1 13
Table 8 presents the breakdown of schooling expenditure by fees, books, uniform, 
transport and miscellaneous expenses of interview households. While freeship students 
did not pay tuition fees, transportation costs were substantial as the schools were the 
farthest away in the most desirable areas of good “standard.” One parent declined 
admission in a school that asked for the entire year’s transport charges as a lump sum 
at the time of admission. Private tuition and uniform costs were also higher than for 
other groups, and costs for books were substantial, though lower than for fee-paying Fee 
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Level 2 private school students. According to interviewees, no freeship school exempted 
students from paying for these. However, freeship households took these charges for 
granted, and were grateful for the tuition fee exemption.
There were at least six cases among the eight Fee Level 2 fee-paying interview households 
that paid a total of Rs.37,000 (US$595) in capitation fees or “donations” at the time of 
admission. In another case, the Rs.10,000 (US$161) capitation fee demanded by the 
school was waived with the intervention of a local MLA. Household responses suggested 
that in elite schools, similar to the freeship school in our sample, this amount could be 
up to Rs.100,000 (US$1,607) or more.
Table 8. — Breakdown of per-child average annual expenditure in elementary education (Rs.) 
Tuition Fee Transport Books Uniform Private 
tuition
Other Total
Government 72 129 184 230 907 12 1,533
Private Fee Level 1 4,134 875 1,564 809 2,160 118 9,660
Private Fee Level 2 18,215 2,615 3,100 1,360 2,375 533* 28,198
EWS Freeship 0 5,182 2,491 2,373 2,454 805 13,304
Source: Semi-structured household interview ﬁ eld data
Notes: Private tuition costs and transport costs have been calculated for 10 months; books and uniforms on a one-
time basis; fees for 12 months.
  * As explained above, there were reported cases of “donations” (i.e. capitation fees) taken at the time of 
admission. These are not included here.
Data on private tuition are revealing. On average, the absolute costs were substantial 
for students accessing all types of schools, including for freeship students. Principals 
at Fee Level 1 schools in our study felt that owing to their lower educational levels and 
lack of time to supervise students, parents accessing these schools routinely, and out 
of necessity, supplemented their children’s education. While in absolute terms, private 
tuition costs were the lowest for government school students, proportionally they were 
the highest, representing 59 percent of total expenditure incurred. However, responses 
indicate that the high proportion of private tuition expenditure for government school 
students was incurred for those who had transferred from private Fee Level 1 schools. 
Students in the household interview sample who had only ever attended government 
schools were generally unsupported by private tuition or incurred nominal charges.
Fee-paying Fee Level 2 private school households were generally better off than those in 
other categories. Typically, two sources of income were common in such households. 
However, among the relatively more expensive set of schools, these households did 
not commonly access elite schools but those with fees closer to Rs10,000 (US$161). 
Furthermore, in several cases, even though these schools went up to secondary level, 
they were often accessed only up to upper-primary, as sustaining the high fees and costs 
of schooling were a challenge.
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5. The RTE Act and Lived Experiences of 
Accessing Schooling
We now turn to data from interviews on the lived experiences of accessing schooling 
under the RTE Act for children from households in our study.
5.1  Household Understandings of the RTE Act 
Despite active NGO campaigning in the vicinity and having households in the interview 
sample that had accessed schooling under the free seats provision, overall, the extent 
of knowledge about the Act and its provisions was limited, even among freeship 
households. A minority of interviewees had relatively accurate information. Among this 
group, one parent knew that in Delhi, the 25 percent quota had been in effect from 2004 
in certain schools. This was accurate regarding the compulsion of schools allotted land 
at concessionary rates by the government, as directed by a 2004 Supreme Court Order. 
One mother, an illiterate housewife who sent her own children to government schools, 
had attended a street play on the Act by an NGO, where she learned some information:
I heard that all the facilities are available in school. There are toilets, separate for boys. There’s 
clean drinking water, and food, free books, uniforms […] For those who sort rubbish, who don’t have 
money, education is free. 
—Suman, mother, freeship household interviewee 
In the comment cited above, two crucial elements of the RTE Act are highlighted—that a 
minimum level of provision must be available to all children and that schooling should 
be free, including for private school students under the freeship.
Of the 30 non-freeship households, only two had tried to obtain admission under the 
freeship (but failed). The overwhelming majority were not aware of it. Some interviewees 
complained that government initiatives for education were often launched, but parents 
were never properly informed of these; others felt that the Department of Education’s 
powers were limited; and some felt that corruption would inhibit proper implementation. 
Furthermore, many freeship households reported that supporting the level of expenditure 
they incurred was tough. One felt that exemption levels should be increased as a result: 
The quota for the poor should be increased. And there’s also some strain on the poor because every 
so often there is a demand for money, like annual charges for which no receipt is given. 
—Suraj, father, freeship household interviewee 
This comment, as with the household schooling expenditure data above, is revealing 
because, in fact, Section 3(2) of the RTE Act clearly deems the right to education to be fee-
free: “no child shall be liable to pay any kind of fee or charges or expenses” (Government 
of India 2009). This is further strengthened in the case of disadvantaged students by 
Section 12(c) of the Act, which outlines the 25 percent quota, and by Section 3 of the 2011 
Delhi Free Seats Order (Government of NCT of Delhi 2011b), which prohibits charging 
any kind of fee to freeship students. 
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Thus, it seems that the freeship schools accessed by household interviewees interpreted 
the fee-free stipulation in the narrowest sense, covering only tuition fees. This may 
have been a deliberate mediation strategy to recoup extra income or an instance of 
misinterpretation. In any case, it was evident that freeship households were not (made) 
aware of the full extent of the provision. 
5.2 Accessing Schools: Household Experiences 
Here we focus on the experiences of households gaining admission in government and 
private schools, and freeship entry in Fee Level 2 private schools. The focus is on how 
the RTE Act’s provisions directed admission processes in the different school types for 
the households in our study. 
5.2.1 General Admission 
Sections 13–15 of the Act specify admission processes (Government of India 2009). 
These include prohibiting: admission or capitation fees and screening procedures for 
children or parents (including testing); refusal if applicants lack documents attesting age; 
and denial at any time during the school year. Admission is meant to be age-appropriate 
(Section 4). In cases of over-subscription either for the freeship or otherwise, selection 
is meant to be random (Section 2(o)). 
Households accessing Fee Level 1 schools claimed that admission was relatively simple, 
but that affordability was the biggest barrier. Though these schools asked for birth 
certiﬁ cates and other documents, parents found them easy to provide, and schools to 
be ﬂ exible about timing. No one reported testing.
Fee-paying Fee Level 2 households reported that schools insisted on entry tests and 
documents. Parents reported that admission was often given for a class level lower than 
that for which had been applied, and that admission could be denied. As reported in 
Section 4.4 above, the large “donations” demanded at the time of admission were an 
additional source of anxiety for parents. Some parents were hesitant in approaching the 
more upmarket schools, especially at secondary level, due to their lower socioeconomic 
backgrounds. 
No parent reported refusal by government schools. In fact, even the catchment area was 
not strictly enforced. Some parents accessed the reportedly better all-though secondary 
schools rather than MCD primary schools after one sibling enrolled. However, parents 
reported difﬁ culty accessing particular government schools commended for their 
teaching quality, security, or English-medium instruction—attributes which, according 
to parents, were often combined in a single school. 
The reputed sarvodaya government schools, established by the Delhi state government 
in the 1990s to provide “quality education to the children from Classes I to XII, under 
one roof, as is being provided in the private … schools” (Directorate of Education 2006, 
cited in Juneja 2010: 21), had a lottery system and rush for seats. Several household 
interviewees were successful; however, the most disadvantaged, with low education 
levels and poor employment, seemed least likely to manage such a move to a more 
desirable government school. 
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5.2.2  Freeship Admission
Among other procedural issues, the Delhi Free Seats Order (Government of NCT of 
Delhi 2012b) speciﬁ es the minimum income (Rs.100,000, US$1,607) and residency 
requirements (three years) (Section 2(c)); prohibits testing (Section 5) and teaching freeship 
students in separate shifts or charging any kind of fee (Section 3); outlines school 
procedures for visibly posting freeship seats and conducting lottery in cases of over-
subscription (Section 4); and speciﬁ es required proof of income and residency 
documents (Section 6).6
While there was a mix of households who were able to secure freeships, unsurprisingly, 
in these cases, both parents were relatively better schooled, and the family had a 
steady if modest income and/or personal connections. There were two types of 
freeship household among our set—one that had managed to secure admission on 
their own (four households), and the other whose journey had been facilitated by an 
NGO or another parent who understood the process and helped respondents complete 
application forms (six households).
The former group were educated and relatively stable economically. This group learned of 
the opportunity through the newspaper, TV, and relatives, and patiently and persistently 
followed up the trail. Three had private sector jobs and rental income. Two among this 
group were fairly well off; one even simultaneously applied to different private schools 
as a fee-paying client, hoping to be successful at any cost. The other household head 
was the son of a jeweler and had an undergraduate degree. His father produced a salary 
certiﬁ cate stating that his income was well below the limit speciﬁ ed. The second group 
had fewer assets, and lower-status jobs. 
Generally, freeship parents were excited by the opportunity the free seats provision 
represented and went through enormous effort to gain admission. They made the 
rounds of neighborhood schools, generally applying to between three and nine schools, 
willing to repeat the process the following year if unsuccessful. Once an application was 
successful, they began strategizing for sibling admission.
But gaining admission under the 25 percent free seats provision was not easy. House-
holds reported that the most difﬁ cult requirement was to obtain an income certiﬁ cate, 
which they understood had a six-month expiry date. Households were thus told that 
if they were unable to secure admission at the ﬁ rst attempt, a fresh certiﬁ cate would 
be required the following year. However, Section 6(a) of the Delhi Free Seats Order 
expressly states: “no student shall be expelled or debarred from the school in case 
of non-submission of above documents without the prior approval of the Director of 
Education” (Government of NCT of Delhi 2012b), and, further, that once admitted in a 
free seat, a self-declaration or afﬁ davit by parents attesting to income is sufﬁ cient.
Although details of the process were communicated to Delhi schools, only a minority of 
parents were aware of them. For those familiar with the procedures, the actual process 
was protracted, tedious, cumbersome and costly. Some reported that private schools 
were evasive about admission details. Required documentation had to be ready, and 
6. Any one of the following documents are considered acceptable for proof of income: certiﬁ cate by a revenue ofﬁ cer 
not below the rank of Tehsildar; BPL ration card (yellow); AAY ration card (pink) (Government of NCT of Delhi 2012b: 
Section 6a).
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many interviewees had to be ready to battle if they were unwilling to bribe, especially for 
the income certiﬁ cate.
There were also other procedural difﬁ culties. Private schools were reported as being 
unhelpful and evasive about dates for submitting forms, announcing acceptance, and 
about the admission lottery. Some freeship households also reported instances of 
private schools demanding “extra fees,” i.e. bribes, to expedite the process, and one 
interviewee claimed that schools deliberately misplaced applications. The following 
parent recounted the anxiety and tension he experienced during the process:
… there was a lot of running around. First get the forms, line up, sometimes they say, “They’re 
available at this time, sometimes at another time.” That’s how they behave. Then you have to go 
to submit the forms, line up, give the forms and documents etc. stamped by two gazetted ofﬁ cers, 
or an MLA. It seems even MLAs don’t have much sway. Maybe ministers, like in our area there’s 
[name of minister withheld] so I got it stamped by him and submitted it. It’s somewhat difﬁ cult. 
—Vimal, father, freeship household interviewee
One interviewee, ultimately successful in securing a freeship at a school, explained how 
some private schools negotiated with parents to avoid accepting full fee waivers, asking 
them to pay whatever they could: 
I completed a form for [name of school withheld]. My younger son’s name got on to the waiting list. 
Then they called me and said, ‘What can you give? Give half the fee amount.
—Suraj, father, freeship household interviewee 
Suraj ended up accessing another private school for his sons through a freeship. He tried 
to protest when that school demanded an annual fee of Rs.3,000–4,000 (US$48–64), 
per child, but to no avail, and this time he acquiesced. When he asked for justiﬁ cation, 
the school insisted:
… we have so many expenses, there’s this and that. I said, ‘We’ve been exempted from paying fees 
by the government.’ But they said, ‘No, these are the expenses for the teachers, the building.
However, some respondents expressed anxiety that the freeship was misused by the 
better-off. The father quoted below, a fee-paying client at a Fee Level 2 school, was 
particularly skeptical about the authenticity of the process: 
Those who secure admissions under this quota are so rich that they can probably pay the fees for 
three children. I know of so many people, I won’t name names, who have a monthly income of 
over 100,000 or 200,000 but their children are going to school under EWS [freeship]. They should 
change the system and the really needy should get it. Private schools should not ﬁ ll vacant seats … 
ninety percent [who are actually eligible] don’t even come forward. They might be hesitant because 
they are less educated. Ninety-nine percent of those who are beneﬁ tting are prosperous … loke 
people should think these people are paying a van [to transport their children], but how? I mean 
it’s all fake, just for show.
—Sanjeev, fee-paying Fee Level 2 household interviewee 
As was evident in Section 4.4 above, none of the freeship households in the study were in 
fact fee-free, and all incurred signiﬁ cant costs. Nonetheless, most freeship households 
in the study, though perhaps not the most disadvantaged or the poorest, would likely 
have been unable to access Fee Level 2 schools without the freeship. 
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5.3 Schooling Perceptions and Experienced Realities 
The following discussion presents data on how households perceived the types of school 
they accessed, as well as their experiences of these schools.
5.3.1 Government Schools
Security issues were raised by household interviewees as a major concern, particularly 
in the boys’ school, where they felt security was threatened by adverse conditions in 
the local slum environment. In addition to poor infrastructure, interviewees were 
overwhelmingly negative about teaching during the boys’ shifts, saying that some 
teachers did not regularly take classes or were not punctual. Two household interviewees 
reported instances of severe corporal punishment. These issues contributed to a sense 
of neglect in government schools, causing anxiety, irritation and anger among parents. 
Though teaching in the girls’ shifts was appreciated, this was overshadowed by negativity 
about the boys’ schools, an attitude which was often projected on the boys in the slum. 
Parents said that the boys were “wicked” and “useless.” Charu, a daily wage laborer and 
mother of four daughters and one son, was satisﬁ ed with the government school for her 
daughters, but remarked that there was regular violence and ﬁ ghting in the boys’ school. 
She thus resorted to private schooling alternatives for her son: 
During the girls’ shift the guards are on duty, but during the boys’ shift they are bribed with money 
for liquor and they disappear. The boys are also hooligans so the guard doesn’t say anything. 
—Charu, household interviewee
Most interviewees felt that the local MCD primary schools situated within the slum were 
the worst compared to other government schools, particularly secondary schools. Some 
parents commented that the teacher—pupil ratios were far too high, and others, that 
that in spite of negligence in teaching, children continued to pass, implying that results 
were faked. In fact, some respondents complained that the RTE policy prohibiting 
students from failing and being held back further aggravated the problem. In the face of 
all this, many parents felt helpless.
However, not all government schools were reported to be dysfunctional and unsafe. A 
few boys’ and almost all the girls’ secondary schools were commended for their security 
arrangements and quality of teaching. This was particularly true for government schools 
in what were considered better localities and those that taught in English from an early 
class (grade). These factors were considered more important than basic facilities, as 
evidenced by the following comment:
I have found very good teachers. The school is good, teaching is good. The only problem is that there 
is no drinking water for my children, and there aren’t any fans. […] Yes, there are guards. Three 
guards. […] In my opinion, it’s a very good school.’ 
—Neera, mother, household interviewee
Another mother shared her daughter’s approval of the government school that she was 
transferred into after having gone to a Fee Level 1 school for a few years, and felt that 
there was discipline and a focus on teaching:
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My daughter tells me about her school, and says, “Mummy, it’s just like a private school here. We 
study, the teachers pay a lot of attention. They give the same kind of attention as I used to get at the 
private school. If you make the smallest mistake then there’s a punishment. You get a scolding.” 
—Damini, mother, household interviewee 
 
The difference in experienced realities between boys’ and girls’ government schools and 
associated issues of meaningful access, deserve further concentrated research in the 
Indian context. Current literature focuses on differentiated access for girls and boys 
due to societal norms, labor market opportunities, and patrilineal marriage customs, to 
which preference for private schooling for males has been attributed. However, it may 
be that internal government school conditions and external inﬂ uences in disadvantaged 
locations aggravate these pressures, and thus enhance greater private school preference 
for boys. The fact that the primary schools situated within the slum were visibly vulnerable 
to violence and security risks also contributed to the reliance on local Fee Level 1 schools 
and the more favored government secondary schools. 
5.3.2 Fee Level 1 Private Schools
In contrast, Fee Level 1 household interviewees felt that there were good security 
arrangements, strict disciplinary measures and careful teaching in the private schools 
they accessed. They felt that these schools provided an escape from the anxiety in 
government schools. However, although most parents rarely complained, as they felt 
teachers were committed, a few felt that disciplinary methods could be harsh in Fee 
Level 1 schools and based on fear. This is highlighted in the comments of two mothers 
accessing Fee Level 1 schools below, one of whom felt that the treatment was too harsh 
in private schools: 
Like if sometimes the children haven’t managed to do their homework then they’re afraid to go to 
school because the teacher will hit them. The teachers should realize that if the child hasn’t done 
the work, wasn’t able to do it, they can ask another child to help them ﬁ nish. So they should pay 
some attention to that so that the child doesn’t miss anything and they don’t have any problems 
later. —Madhu, mother, fee-paying Fee Level 1 household interviewee, 
When the children don’t do their work, the teacher threatens them. The government school never 
hit the children, but private schools hit them. 
—Sona, mother, fee-paying Fee Level 1 household interviewee
Nonetheless, most parents felt that children learned more in these schools as compared 
to government schools. Many interviewees felt that children who were transferred to 
government schools lost the learning achievements they might have gained. The 
following experience was of a disheartened father who felt his attempts to secure an 
education for his children failed in the case of his eldest son, whom he had transferred 
to a government school after completing Class 5 in the local private school:
I sent my elder son to the government school. There are no desks there, no fans, and poor teaching. 
Seeing the plight of the elder son, I sent my second child to private school. […] [when we transferred 
him] within a year he forgot everything he learned in the private school. I spent so much money 
and he forgot everything when I put him in the government school. He took a test for two places 
[for readmission in private schools], and failed both. 
—Jairam, father, household interviewee 
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However, there was some dissent among interviewees accessing Fee Level 1 schools 
and a large number of households accessing Fee Level 2 schools regarding the former’s 
quality. Many points regarding government schools, such as high pupil—teacher ratios 
and limited school infrastructure were also raised regarding Fee Level 1 schools. Concerns 
about teachers were raised too, though of a different nature. Interviewees spoke of 
teachers’ relative youth and inexperience, frequent turnover, and lack of qualiﬁ cations, 
including at the two most accessed Fee Level 1 schools in our study.
The social embeddedness of schools also emerged. Some households claimed that Fee 
Level 1 schools attracted children from the squatter colony, since fees were comparatively 
lower. They claimed this led to a disruptive school environment and other negative 
factors such as poor hygiene.
Finally, learning outcomes were questioned. One parent claimed that all her daughter 
achieved was better handwriting, which she considered superﬁ cial. Three respondents 
said that they were looking for a higher quality school, but the government and local 
private schools were all too similar. As stated by the interviewee below, some criticized 
the quality of English teaching in Fee Level 1 schools, which was highlighted by these 
schools as a special feature in contrast to government schools. 
It’s English-medium in name only. It’s not like the children know anything. What’s the meaning 
of English-medium? That you talk to the children in English. Whatever you teach, you say it in 
English. That’s the only way children will learn. But the children don’t know how to speak, they 
know nothing. It’s just English-medium in name. 
—Girija, fee-paying Fee Level 1 household interviewee
The father below, accessing a Fee Level 2 school, spoke of Fee Level 1 schools with 
disdain. He wished not to dignify them with the term “private,” using “semi-private” 
instead, intimating that the former was reserved for what he felt were higher-quality 
(usually high-fee, elite) schools: 
Government schools are absolutely rotten. Then there is a semi-private one here charging Rs.400, 
200, 300. They are even worse because they just take money but teach absolutely nothing. 
—Sanjeev, father, fee-paying Fee Level 2 household interviewee 
5.3.3 Fee Level 2 Private Schools (Freeship and Fee-paying)
Fee-paying and freeship parents in Fee Level 2 schools were generally satisﬁ ed with the 
security arrangements and well-guarded premises, school environment, and purportedly 
good teaching quality, including English-language instruction. The fact that Fee Level 2 
schools were located in middle-class neighborhoods also increased parents’ satisfaction. 
Teachers were reported as being loving and encouraging, giving tokens of appreciation. 
Facilities were reported to be high-level, i.e. swimming pools, playroom, games, and 
computers (as in the elite freeship school in our study), which, according to some 
households, are necessary for children’s enjoyment at school. In this way, there were 
hints that a new education discourse may emerge in particular circumstances, perhaps 
closer to the RTE Act’s concept of “child-friendly education” (Government of India 2009: 
Section 29). 
Parents were generally conscious that freeship admission may come at a price, that their 
children may be treated differently from the others in some way. More than one parent 
had discussions with their children about their experiences, and speciﬁ cally, about 
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whether they were treated differently. The following couple accessed the elite Fee Level 
2 school in our study (School 5) through a freeship: 
I also keep asking the children if everything is alright, how do they teach, how are the facilities, 
everything. To make sure that it’s not like anything’s being done separately or that they’ll 
do something separately with the EWS [freeship] children, you know? So the children say that 
everything is alright, everyone is the same. 
—Payal, mother, freeship household interviewee
There is a double shift… but our children go in the morning shift. This time they’re not taking the 
evening shift, I found out. They’re reducing that now. 
—Payal’s husband, freeship household interviewee
Payal’s husband is referring to School 5’s “slum school project” (see Section 6.2.1 
below), in which disadvantaged children were taught in a separate shift in the evening. 
This household claimed that as freeship students, their children were not segregated, 
but part of the main school.
Unlike households in the previous categories, freeship Fee Level 2 households did 
not express tension about having to change schools in the future, a major source of 
satisfaction. This was also because the schools they accessed were all-through schools. 
According to the Act, however, the freeship applies only to elementary education (i.e. 
Class 8). It remains to be seen how this will affect freeship households at secondary 
level. 
There were signs of some anxiety, perhaps relating to a new environment at Fee Level 
2 schools, even though the children attending them in our sub-sample were not ﬁ rst 
generation learners. There was confusion about evaluation methods in these schools. 
One mother reported a teacher’s dissatisfaction with her son’s lack of discipline in the 
classroom. Another mother was worried about her son’s performance, which seemed 
to be deteriorating with increasing class (grade) levels. Her concern assumes more 
signiﬁ cance when we set it against the freeship school (School 5) principal’s comments. 
He claimed that he had to promote students even if achievement was poor (see also 
Section 6.2.3).
My younger son was good in studies. And the teacher used to say, “Does your son study beforehand? 
He’s very good.” Now I don’t know what happened. Does the teacher have a bad attitude, or what 
is it that’s causing him to become weaker and weaker in his studies? 
—Rani, mother, freeship household interviewee 
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6. School Responses to the RTE Act
All private and government school principals in the study were aware of the RTE Act 
and claimed to be in favor of it. However, there were bureaucratic delays in the ofﬁ cial 
notiﬁ cation of rules and procedures. The 2011 Delhi RTE Rules specifying how the RTE 
Act would be implemented in Delhi were issued much later in the 2011–2012 school 
year (November 2011). Reimbursement procedures and amounts were only speciﬁ ed in 
March 2012, near the end of the year (Government of NCT of Delhi 2012b). However, 
the 2011 Delhi Free Seats Order, specifying the rules and procedures to institute the free 
seats provision, was issued in January 2011 in time for the 2011–12 school year. Despite 
the delay in notifying the Delhi Rules and certain procedures, principals mentioned 
receiving circulars and having meetings with the Department of Education regarding the 
25 percent free seats provision in particular. Here we discuss the most immediate ways 
that the RTE Act affects private schools, and present data on how schools in our study 
implemented/mediated the provisions.
6.1 The RTE Act and the Changing Education Landscape for 
Schools
Results indicate that there are two immediate ways in which the RTE Act affected 
private schools in our study (and generally), and a third affecting both private and 
government schools. The ﬁ rst is the 25 percent free seats provision. The RTE Act 
extends this compulsion to all private unaided schools, whereas under the earlier 2004 
Supreme Court Order, it was applicable to a small sub-section of (mainly elite) private 
unaided schools in Delhi who had been allotted land at concessional rates by the Delhi 
Development Authority.
Second is the threat of closure within three years (i.e. by 2013) of all unrecognized 
private schools and recognized private schools that do not meet Schedule 1 norms 
(Government of India 2009: Sections 18 and 19). Norms specify pupil—teacher ratio; 
building and infrastructure; number of instructional school days and hours; number of 
working hours per week for teachers; teaching and learning equipment; library; and play, 
games, and sports equipment (see Appendix). 
Third is the way that the RTE Act has changed the pedagogical scenario, affecting private 
and government schools, and is perhaps the most pivotal. In addition to providing the 
set infrastructure and quality norms in all private and government schools, the Act 
legislates that children are meant to have a stress-free schooling experience (Section 
29(2)(f)), a child-friendly and learner-paced mode of learning (Section 29(2)(e)), and a 
continuous evaluation system (Section 29(2)(h)). Children are neither meant to be held 
back nor failed (Section 16), and board examinations are to be eliminated during the 
elementary school years (Section 30(1)) (Government of India 2009). 
In many ways, these provisions and others on curriculum and completion of elementary 
education (Government of India 2009: Sections 29–30) are the legal articulation and 
extension of the way in which educationists and project plans have been pushing 
curriculum development and reform for many years (e.g. under the District Primary 
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Education Programme and SSA; and by groups like Eklavya, BODH, Digantar, etc. (Blum, 
2009), spurred by the problem of drop-outs from primary and upper-primary levels. 
Some of these efforts had already been incorporated into government schools. The real 
change is that this mode of curriculum delivery and reform has become mandatory 
under the RTE Act. 
6.2 School-level Implementation and Mediation of the RTE Act
Data indicate that there were different nuances of interpretation by schools in 
implementing the Act. These school-level responses and mediation strategies may have 
results that were unintended by policy-makers, speciﬁ cally regarding the inclusion of 
disadvantaged groups. The variations in implementation may be due to incomplete 
and/or delayed information, conceptual errors in interpretation, lack of preparedness for 
implementation, or other institutional barriers that may indicate a degree of resistance. 
The following describes how schools in the study understood and implemented important 
sections of the Act, with special reference to the 25 percent provision, infrastructure and 
recognition norms and curriculum issues.
6.2.1  Mediating the 25 Percent Free Seats Provision
There appeared to be overt and covert resistance by private schools in the study to 
implementing the free seats provision. The rationale and mediation strategies varied, 
ranging from non-compliance, to evasion, to reinvention of the Act and the provision. 
Although all private schools in the study claimed to have received government circulars, 
principals of Fee Level 1 schools admitted that freeship admission was negligible overall. 
School 1 claimed that the provision was expressly not meant for lower-fee schools like 
theirs, as their fees were already low, and such concessions were not possible in such 
schools: 
Of course, I think that the EWS quota is important. The stipulation is to give free education to 25 
percent of your students. Earlier these people did not comply but when the High Court order came, 
they were forced to take in the 25 percent. It has to be 25 percent of the total number enrolled. If 
four children are admitted, one has to be in the EWS category. One seat out of the four has to be 
kept vacant. 
Are you taking such students?
No, we don’t do it. Other private schools are doing it. We’re educating children free of cost anyway.
—Principal, School 1
This principal attributed the 25 percent free seats provision to the earlier 2004 Supreme 
Court Order, and distanced his and other lower-fee schools from its applicability under 
the Act, not recognizing the distinction between the two. However, the three other 
Fee Level 1 schools claimed they had complied. Two of them claimed to have received 
applications under the quota, though the third said no new admissions had been made 
as inadequate documentation was provided by households. This latter school submitted 
the names of 10 children already enrolled, all falling below the poverty line, under the 
quota and forwarded them to the Department.
There was a lack of clarity on reimbursement processes and amounts, a legitimate issue 
given bureaucratic delays, particularly for schools already facing concerns of ﬁ nancial 
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viability. It is another question as to whether lower-fee schools are able to admit children 
on a reimbursement model with delayed pay-out, given the precarious nature of their 
operations, as they may not have the reserve funds to initially cover the cost of admitting 
additional students and meeting other provisions of the Act (e.g. hiring more and better 
qualiﬁ ed teachers; upgrading facilities, etc.).
School 5’s principal, the elite freeship school, in contrast, showed a high degree of comfort 
with the free seats provision. As the school had been allotted land at concessional rates, 
he had been admitting children for some time, and did not feel it was difﬁ cult to admit 25 
percent of their students under the quota. He espoused the lottery system for admission 
stipulated in the Act as a sound strategy, and one that he used. 
However, the slum school project (see also Section 5.3.3 above), proudly introduced as 
a successful instructional strategy, contravenes the RTE Act. The principal claimed that 
these children received free meals, uniforms and books, and did not pay fees. Children 
from disadvantaged groups were taught in a separate shift, with separate staff, but in the 
same facilities in the evening. However, Section 3(b) of the Delhi Free Seats Order clearly 
states, “No separate or exclusive class or shift shall be arranged for imparting education 
to the students admitted against free seats” (Government of NCT of Delhi 2011a). 
Thus, early results indicate that the potential of the free seats provision may be 
compromised in different ways. Schools may not comply, parents may face procedural 
challenges like the insistence on speciﬁ c documentation, and private schools may 
invent new ways of maintaining social closure, such as introducing separate shifts. As 
household-level data above showed, school mediation of the free seats provision made 
accessing private schools through the freeship very difﬁ cult. 
6.2.2 Operational and Recognition Norms
All schools must fulﬁ ll the infrastructure and other norms speciﬁ ed in Schedule 1 (see 
Appendix). The children in our household survey patronized a staggering 44 schools, 
of which at least 50 percent were smaller private schools. Almost all of these could 
be traced to the MCD list of recognized schools. The most frequently accessed were 
recognized primary schools, like the ones in our study. None of the private schools in 
our sample or in the immediate vicinity of our site were unrecognized. 
As intimated above, the four Fee Level 1 schools had basic infrastructure, while the elite 
school’s infrastructure was impressive. All private schools claimed complete compliance 
as recognized schools, but this was not necessarily accurate. For example, none had a 
playground, and all schools, including the elite school, were reluctant to provide data 
on student enrollment, staff qualiﬁ cations and salaries. Informal enquiries suggest that 
teaching staff was largely untrained. Most Fee Level 1 schools claimed that they were 
paying salaries as per government scales to their teachers, though this could not be 
veriﬁ ed. 
Despite these issues, none of the principals expressed any anxiety about Schedule 1 
norms. Only longer-term research can show if, as in previous studies (Ohara 2013; 
Srivastava 2008b; Tooley and Dixon 2005), private schools are successful in maintaining 
their recognition status through the use of perverse incentives through administrative or 
political inﬂ uence and bribery.
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While the focus has been on private schools, it is evident from the two government 
schools that there is much to be done in state schools to ensure minimum infrastructure 
mandated under the Act. While teachers in government schools in our study were trained 
and drew impressive salaries, the problem of adequately trained staff in the state sector 
generally is acute. The well-known strategy of hiring contract “para-teachers” at lower 
salaries, i.e. locally available personnel, some of whom may not be adequately trained, 
was a stop-gap measure to expand access quickly, but is no longer viable under the Act. 
Finally, teacher absenteeism in government schools is a noted problem. 
6.2.3 Child-friendly, Child-centered Education
During school visits, all Fee Level 1 schools were quiet, disciplined, and highly functional, 
with high levels of teaching activity. However, teachers used the teacher-focused chalk-
and-talk method. Interviews with principals of Fee Level 1 schools and researcher 
observation did not suggest any change in curriculum delivery or pedagogic practice as 
envisaged under the Act, though these seemed better incorporated in the elite freeship 
school (School 5). In Fee Level 1 schools, the stress was on homework, private tuition, 
and tests. During observations, the government girls’ school had some level of teaching 
activity, but no teaching was going on in the boys’ school, where teachers were occupied 
by administrative tasks. 
Despite lower levels of teaching activity, the rhetoric of change required in classroom 
processes and school approach seems to have been understood in principle by the 
government schools. The “continuous comprehensive evaluation” (CCE) method 
mandated by the Act (Section 29, Government of India, 2009) envisions a system 
without high-stakes testing, favoring instead summative and formative continuous 
assessment. The government girls’ school principal praised the simple language of the 
general textbooks being used, but said that teachers were concerned about the social 
science textbooks because of the unavoidable use of technical words that frequently had 
to be repeated. She also said that children were not “rote-learning parrots,” and that they 
need to be engaged in order to learn well.
However, as was clear from the interview at the government boys’ school, there was 
less commitment to CCE principles. In fact, the danger of a technicist interpretation 
of some of the provisions is the automatic promotion of students without sufﬁ cient 
attention being paid to meaningful learning processes and outcomes. For example, the 
boys’ school interpreted the provision prohibiting expulsion or holding students back a 
class (grade) as a compulsory order to pass and mark as present all children, whether or 
not they attended examinations:
Principal: It’s a problem for us when we have to declare results.
Interviewer: How do you assess?
Principal: ... We get orders from above [not to] fail anyone. You’re not allowed to mark anyone 
absent ... and their attendance should be a certain percentage. Now they’re saying that we have to 
pass them under any circumstances.
Teacher: The students don’t even come to sit for the exam. Even then we’re getting orders from 
above to pass these children. So the child who hasn’t even sat for the exam has to be passed. 
—Principal, School 7 and Teacher Intervention, School 7 
Principals in the study generally felt that taking away the possibility of failing a class 
(grade) did nothing but postpone the problem for children who do not achieve. The 
WORKING PAPER
India’s Right to Education Act: Household Experiences and Private School Responses 37
government school teacher at the boys’ school above further condemned the policy, 
feeling it resulted in meaningless advancement: 
The right to education, they must get that. But then they put this condition that everyone has to be 
passed. I’m not in agreement with this because even someone who hasn’t gained full knowledge is 
going to go forward. He’ll go ahead but won’t able to continue.
—Teacher intervention during interview with principal, School 7
CCE is purportedly implemented by the Central Board of Secondary Education, the board 
followed by most elite schools, including the elite freeship school in our study, and by 
secondary schools run by the Delhi government. The freeship school’s principal claimed 
to have changed teaching practice to match the CCE method, and to prefer broad-based 
learning to develop the full potential of a child’s talents. He stated that all children have 
different strengths and can progress: 
No test. I cancelled it. You see the beauty of this Act is I still don’t believe that the child who has 
not [achieved a mark of ] 90 percent, 60 percent cannot do anything in life. Therefore what is the 
harm if that child gets admission? If he does not pass Class 10 but through the education, through 
the other part of the education, through activities … the conﬁ dence that child builds up—that 
will work. He will ﬁ nd his way and it is happening. The children who are not strong academically, 
they are still doing wonderfully. They have gone on to some vocational streams. They have the 
conﬁ dence to move to the people and display their powers.
Children should be given freedom. You see when CBSE has introduced the CCE—excellent. The 
productivity has increased. Our basic duty is to expose the talent of the child. If the child has got talent 
beyond academics and certain activities, then our duty is to encourage it. 
—Principal, School 5 
However, this optimism about a system that explores and develops the talents of every 
child disappeared when he considered the issue of integrating freeship students. In 
fact, this principal felt that the integrative model espoused in the Act was pedagogically 
weak. He stressed that demanding the integration of disadvantaged and advantaged 
children in the same classroom was harmful given the discrepancy in learning levels and 
background knowledge, which was a source of worry for teachers and students:
The child who is scoring 90 percent and the child who comes from a totally different background 
and does not even know his ABCD—at what level should a teacher teach? Even at average level, 
the children ﬁ nd it difﬁ cult to cope. Education is to build conﬁ dence in the child. It’s not about 
providing marks. 
—Principal, School 5
He contrasted this with the school’s slum school project, claiming it to be a “successful 
experiment” as it catered to the presumed different needs, social backgrounds, and 
habits of these students:
I tell you they are doing much, much better. They are conﬁ dent […] the staff is very well equipped. 
You see these are Indians, so they know the conditions in the jhuggi jhopdi and slum area. They 
know … how parents talk to their children in that area, what are their food habits, sanitation so 
they talk to them in their language only. They come down to that level. 
—Principal, School 5
Thus, according to this principal and contrary to the spirit of the Act, presumed success 
rests not on minimizing the differences between different groups through inclusion, but 
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on an approach based on distinct social groupings. In fact, there was a strong feeling 
that inclusion would not work, and that segregation was doing the job much better: 
Integration does not come simply by making children sit together […] If I go to the billionaire and I 
sit there, what will I do? Is this integration? I must come at par with him so that I can talk with his 
tongue. So I ﬁ rst bring these children at par with the others and I ﬁ nd that their growth is better. I 
can produce IITans,7 doctors, engineers from that jhuggi jhopdi by this project. … there are students 
which I have taken under this 25 percent quota failing in their subjects. Though I do not feel like it, 
I promote every child but they are failing for the last four to ﬁ ve years. If I take them failing up to 
Class 10, where will they land? In the evening school I teach them, train them, rather, especially for 
eight years—and no child fails. 
—Principal, School 5
7. “IIT” refers to the Indian Institute of Technology, a premier, world-renowned and highly competitive body of institutes 
for engineering and related ﬁ elds.
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7. Discussion and Conclusions
As a relatively better-resourced urban slum in Delhi with an active NGO presence 
conducting mobilization activities related to the Act, and availability of a healthy mix 
of government and private schools of varying fee levels in the vicinity, Karampur 
represented a dynamic and relevant context for the objectives of the study. Given the 
newness of the Act and its implementation process, particularly at the time of ﬁ eldwork, 
we believed these attributes would increase the likelihood of capturing a reasonable 
number of schools and households with relatively good basic understandings of the 
Act and its provisions, and, in particular, of households accessing private schooling 
under the 25 percent free seats provision. Thus, Karampur was deliberately chosen as 
a counterfactual to the “straw man fallacy” and the pervasive skepticism in general 
public discourse on the viability of the Act. Approaching it in another way, similar to 
Mills’s (2008) suggestions on the application of Bourdieuian theoretical perspectives, 
we attempted to retain the possibility of the transformative potential of the Act and its 
provisions.
However, results show that, at least for the majority of households in this study, the 
early RTE Act context did not substantively change the spectrum of schools accessed 
by them or intra-household decisions around schooling. We were only able to ﬁ nd four 
households in the original sample of over 280 that beneﬁ tted from the freeship until 
deliberate snowballing efforts were made to grant access six more (amounting to just 
3.4 percent of the sample), and none were from the poorer squatter jhuggi settlement. 
Given the relatively low socioeconomic proﬁ le and higher availability of and engagement 
with schools in the study site, one might have expected to ﬁ nd higher uptake of the 
freeship.
The particular lineaments of the household sample provide an unusual glimpse of the 
schooling options available to the community. We had parents accessing private schools 
in nearly three different tiers, fee-paying lower-/middle-fee school clients, fee-paying 
middle-/higher-fee school clients, and freeship high-fee private (in fact, reduced fee-
paying) school clients, in addition to government school households. All four household 
groups expressed the desire for and attributed higher quality to schools in middle-class 
or upscale neighborhoods, government or private alike, placing elite private schools at 
the top of the rung. 
Although all principals claimed to be well aware of the Act, there was a considerable 
gap between the ofﬁ cial articulation of the Act’s provisions and its implementation in 
practice. Given the focus of our study, the analysis largely focused on private school 
responses to the 25 percent free seats provision. Results showed that private schools in 
the study engaged in “unruly practices” (Kabeer 2000) and employed “shadow rules” 
(Srivastava 2008b) to implement the provision. In this early stage of implementation, 
some possible mediation strategies have emerged from the data. 
The ﬁ rst is misinterpretation (which may or may not be deliberate) and/or evasion, for 
example by admitting existing students under the quota; operating separating shifts; 
narrowly interpreting the fee-free stipulation to cover tuition fees only; or, as School 1 
did, evading its implementation and attributing its applicability to higher-fee schools. It 
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is interesting to note that while the elite private school admitted the largest proportion 
of disadvantaged children under the 25 percent free seats provision in our sample, 
in comparison with the other private schools, it employed the most segregationist 
pedagogic strategy. 
The second strategy may be a technicist interpretation so that the letter of the law is 
followed, but not its spirit. One example is the way in which the “no detention” policy 
was interpreted as compulsory passing of students with or without learning goals being 
achieved. Added to this were shadow rules surrounding admission, particularly by 
higher-fee schools, as reported by households, such as demands for capitation fees, 
particular documents, extra fees (i.e. bribes) to move the process along, and a general 
evasiveness about timelines for freeship applications and procedures, making these 
schools more difﬁ cult to access.
Some of these strategies may or may not have been deliberate, but were aggravated by 
a lack of clarity and timely information on certain aspects of implementing the Act and 
its provisions, though the Delhi Free Seats Order was issued in time for the 2011—12 
school year. It may be that since the freeship reimbursement amounts and procedures 
are now clear, the scenario may change. 
Schools charging less than or close to the monthly reimbursement maximum of Rs.1,190 
(US$19) per child in Delhi may be inclined to institute the provision to a greater extent, 
as for the lowest-fee schools it may help to secure a certain proportion of income where 
fee collection and enrollment is often precarious, though this remains to be seen. Of 
course, the reimbursement model assumes that schools have the upfront capital to 
accommodate more students while meeting other requirements (e.g. upgrading teacher 
qualiﬁ cations and salaries), which may not be possible for the lowest-fee schools. 
While cream-skimming by ability or social background is prohibited under the Act, it was 
the relatively less disadvantaged households that were able to avail themselves of the 
freeship and access purportedly better, higher-fee private schools. Freeship children came 
from relatively more economically stable families and had parents that were relatively 
better schooled. These parents showed tremendous persistence, approached a number 
of schools, and made contact with the “right” people (e.g. local politicians, friends and 
family with relevant connections, and local NGOs). In the Bourdieuian sense, these 
households had higher social capital and actively strategized to ensure freeship access.
Data also expose that fee-free freeship private education, at least for households in our 
study, was not a reality in the early phase of the RTE Act’s implementation. There were 
substantial related costs for households accessing these schools under the 25 percent 
free seats provision. The cheapest option was still government schooling, which was 
accessed by the majority of poor and very poor households. In addition to cost barriers, 
the general lack of awareness of the Act and the free seats provision, the opacity of 
the freeship application process, timeliness of freeship announcements to applicants, 
importance of social networks, and household ease and familiarity with interacting with 
private schools (the more desirable higher-fee private schools in particular), posed 
signiﬁ cant barriers in households’ attempts at securing a free place. 
Furthermore, sustained access for freeship households to these schools was contingent 
on household ability to pay substantial additional costs (e.g. transportation, books, 
private tuition, etc.). This made the freeship alternative even more expensive as compared 
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to fee-paying households in the study accessing local lower-/medium-fee schools. The 
cheapest option was still the government sector. In fact, our analysis showed that daily 
wage-earning households in Delhi (Rs.6,422, US$103 per month) and those meeting the 
maximum income criterion for the freeship (Rs.100,000, US$1,607 per year) would be 
unable to access the private sector for a sustained period, if at all, including for freeship 
students, if schools charged fees similar to those in our study.
The near universal admonishment by households of boys’ government schools regarding 
legitimate security and delinquency issues requires further research. It may be that, 
in addition to traditional norms, labor market opportunities, and patrilineal marriage 
customs, these dysfunctions aggravate gender gaps in the private sector. However, we 
must be careful not to paint all schools in the government or private sectors with the 
same brush. Household interviews revealed that experiences at government and private 
schools were varied. While parents were appreciative of the security and commitment 
of teachers in private schools, there were also dissenting voices about the quality of 
education, particularly in lower-/medium-fee schools. Parents noted lack of adequate 
infrastructure, high turnover of teaching staff and the opacity of school processes as 
concerns. 
Regarding the 25 percent free seats provision, given the heterogeneity of the private 
unaided sector in India, with schools ranging from modest one-room operations in 
rural areas to elite upscale urban schools, some with facilities rivalling small colleges in 
Western contexts, it is unrealistic to assume that it will be possible to level the playing 
ﬁ eld en masse, though it might be possible to provide access to a minority of the (less) 
disadvantaged to better schools. It is clear that there are signiﬁ cant social and political 
issues that will have to be addressed beyond the RTE Act as a legal instrument and 
technical framework for it to be realized in full.
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Appendix: Schedule 1 Norms
The following is a reproduction of Schedule 1 norms as they appear in the original 2009 
RTE Act (Government of India 2009).
The Schedule (See sections 19 and 25)
NORMS AND STANDARDS FOR A SCHOOL
SI. 
No.
Item  Norms and Standards
1. Number of teachers
(a) For ﬁ rst class to ﬁ fth class Admitted children Number of teachers
Up to sixty Two
Between sixty-one to ninety Three
Between ninety-one to one 
hundred and twenty
Four
Between one hundred and 
twenty-one to two hundred
Five
Above one hundred and ﬁ fty 
children
Five plus one head-teacher
Above two hundred children Pupil–teacher ratio 
(excluding head-teacher) 
shall not exceed forty
(b) For sixth class to eighth class (1) At least one teacher per class so that there shall be at 
least one teacher each for—
 (i) Science and Mathematics;
 (ii) Social Studies;
 (iii) Languages.
(2) At least one teacher for every thirty-ﬁ ve children.
(3) Where admission of children is above one hundred—
 (i) a full time head-teacher
 (ii) part time instructor for—
  (A) Art Education;
  (B) Health and Physical Education;
  (C) Work Education
2. Building All-weather building consisting of—
 (i) at least one classroom for every teacher and an ofﬁ ce-
cum-store-cum-Head teacher’s room;
 (ii) barrier-free access;
 (iii) separate toilets for boys and girls;
 (iv) safe and adequate drinking water facility for all 
children;
 (v) a kitchen where midday meal is cooked in the school;
 (vi) Playground;
 (vii) arrangements for securing the school building by 
boundary wall or fencing.
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SI. 
No.
Item  Norms and Standards
3. Minimum number of working 
days/instructional hours in an 
academic year
 (i) two hundred working days for ﬁ rst class to ﬁ fth class
 (ii) two hundred and twenty working days for sixth class 
to eighth class;
 (iii) eight hundred instructional hours per academic year 
for ﬁ rst class to ﬁ fth class;
 (iv) one thousand instructional hours per academic year 
for sixth class to eighth class.
4. Minimum number of working 
hours per week for the teacher
Forty-ﬁ ve teaching including preparation hours.
5. Teaching learning equipment Shall be provided to each class as required.
6. Library There shall be a library in each school providing newspapers, 
magazines and books on all subjects, including story-books.
7. Play material, games and sports 
equipment
Shall be provided to each class as required
    
T.K. Viswanathan
Secretary to the Govt. of India  
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